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  In 1947, the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo declared that aggressive war was no longer a generic breach of 
international law implicating only state responsibility. It was the 
supreme international crime, one for which individuals could be 
prosecuted and punished. On the plane of international law, the 
decision was monumentally important. But for nearly seventy years, 
the promise it represented withered as the international community 
struggled to draw the precise contours of the offense. That promise 
was supposedly revived on June 11, 2010. At the close of the Review 
Conference of the International Criminal Court in Kampala, Uganda, 
the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal Court 
adopted the first precise, widely accepted definition of aggression. But 
rather than a groundbreaking achievement, the definition is 
anachronistic, dangerous, and unworkable. Its exclusive focus on 
state behavior creates an overly restricted conception of aggression 
that cannot be applied to the present reality of international armed 
conflict. Modern aggression is increasingly perpetrated by nonstate 
actors whose nature and characteristics place them outside the most 
widely accepted definition of the state. Even abandoning this 
traditional conception of statehood for a constructive interpretation 
cannot guarantee that the definition will encompass all relevant 
nonstate actors. This Note argues that the current state-centric 
approach thus creates a backward-looking definition that cannot be 
given practical effect without either weakening the international 
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system or undermining efforts to prosecute aggression and suppress 
global terrorism. Consequently, the Assembly of States Parties should 
rewrite the definition of aggression to expressly include both states 
and nonstate groups. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the four core international crimes, the crime of 
aggression—individual responsibility for illegal war—is considered 
supreme.1 But unlike the other core offenses—genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes—a historical inability to draw its 
precise contours has largely relegated the prosecution of aggression 
to the annals of legal history. After nearly a decade of negotiations, 
however, the international community has made a breakthrough.2 At 
the June 2010 Review Conference of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in Kampala, Uganda, the Assembly of States Parties to 
the International Criminal Court (ASP) adopted the first precise, 
widely accepted definition of the crime. 
Unfortunately, this new definition is fundamentally flawed: it 
refers exclusively to state behavior.3 Professor Noah Weisbord, an 
independent expert delegate to the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression (Special Working Group) that was charged by 
the ASP with drafting the new definition, recognizes this defect. He 
contends that by employing a dynamic conception of statehood, the 
definition can be extended beyond its literal text and applied to 
nonstate actors.4 This solution is inadequate. The definition of 
 
 1. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (Sept. 
30, 1946), in 22 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERG, GERMANY 411, 421 (1950). 
This Note uses the terms “aggression” and “the crime of aggression” interchangeably. 
 2. “International community” is used throughout this Note as shorthand for the society of 
states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that regard themselves 
as bound by common rules in their dealings with each other, their pursuit of common interests 
and values, and their participation in common institutions. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE 
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 8–16 (1977) (outlining the 
concept of an international community). 
 3. Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties, The Crime of Aggression, 
Annex I, art. 8 bis, ICC Doc. RC/Res.6 (advance version June 28, 2010). 
 4. Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 30 (2009) 
(“[T]he best . . . approach . . . is to read the word ‘State’ dynamically and incrementally to 
include state-like entities.”). In a previous telephone conversation, Professor Weisbord 
acknowledged that he did not particularly like the idea of a dynamic conception of statehood, 
but stressed that he believed it was the only practical means by which to extend the definition of 
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aggression should be rewritten to refer explicitly to both states and 
nonstate groups.5 A formulation that expressly captures within its 
ambit both types of entities as separate categories mirrors the present 
reality of international armed conflict and is easily adapted to future 
scenarios. By contrast, failure to abandon the current state-centric 
approach will create a backward-looking definition that cannot be 
given practical effect without either weakening the international 
system or undermining efforts to prosecute aggression and suppress 
global terrorism. 
This Note analyzes the consequences of accepting and applying 
the new definition of aggression, and offers a new approach. Part I 
provides the historical background that underscores the importance 
of the crime in international law and the difficulty of the task that was 
entrusted to the Special Working Group.6 Part II highlights the 
evolution in the pattern of international armed conflict that mandates 
a non-state-based definition of aggression. International terrorism has 
emerged as the greatest contemporary threat to peace and security 
and represents the most prevalent form of aggression today. As such, 
it must be encompassed by any relevant definition of aggression.7 Part 
III sets forth modern conceptions of statehood and demonstrates that 
terrorist organizations fall outside their bounds. Because terrorist 
groups cannot be construed as states, Part III demonstrates that the 
definition of aggression as presently conceived cannot be applied to 
all aggression scenarios. Part IV reveals that, even if these taxonomic 
difficulties are ignored, interpreting the current definition to refer 
constructively to nonstate groups will weaken the international 
system and will defeat efforts to prosecute aggression and eliminate 
international terrorism. Together, Parts II through IV demonstrate 
 
aggression to both state and nonstate entities. 
 5. In 2017, the ASP will revisit the definition of aggression and consider proposed 
amendments. See ICC, supra note 3, para. 4 (resolving “to review the amendments on the crime 
of aggression seven years after the beginning of the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction”). When it 
does, the ASP should strongly consider expanding the definition to expressly include nonstate 
entities.  
 6. Because several scholars have meticulously traced the development of the crime of 
aggression, the background provided in Part I is brief. For an in-depth historical analysis of the 
crime of aggression, see generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal 
Court to Punish Aggression, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 551, 551–60 (2007); Noah 
Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 162–96 (2008). 
 7. See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 8 (“A backward-looking definition that fails to regulate 
important forms of aggression as they emerge is fated to become irrelevant. A definition that 
does not fit the sociological phenomenon it seeks to regulate is, and will be perceived to be, 
unjust.”). 
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the need to rewrite the definition of aggression to refer expressly to 
both states and nonstate groups. The concept of nonstate groups, 
however, must be properly bounded; it must be broad enough to 
allow effective prosecution of those entities capable of committing 
acts of aggression, but narrow enough to exclude ones that cannot 
perpetrate the crime. Part V concludes the analysis with some 
suggestions for achieving this limited conception of nonstate groups. 
I.  FROM NUREMBERG TO KAMPALA: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
OF THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION 
In late March 1941, U.S. Attorney General Robert H. Jackson 
opined that waging aggressive war constituted an international crime. 
“Present aggressive wars,” he argued, “are civil wars against the 
international community.”8 The International Military Tribunals, 
established four years later at Nuremberg and Tokyo, agreed.9 In one 
of the most storied passages of their final judgment, the Nuremberg 
judges declared that a war of aggression was “essentially an evil 
thing,” for “[t]o initiate a war of aggression . . . is not only an 
international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing 
from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated 
evil of the whole.”10 The import of these tribunals on the plane of 
international law was monumental.11 “For the first time,” Professor 
Danilo Zolo observes, “aggressive war was not conceived of as a 
generic breach of international law involving the liability of a state as 
 
 8. Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Attorney Gen., Address Before the Inter-American Bar 
Association (Mar. 27, 1941), in 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 353–55 (1941). 
 9. The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted twelve defendants of the crime of aggression. 
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, supra note 1, 
at 485–528. The Tokyo Tribunal convicted twenty-four. Judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, in 103 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE JUDGMENT, 
SEPARATE OPINIONS, PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS, APPEALS AND REVIEWS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 49,773–851 (R. John Pritchard ed., 
1998). 
 10. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, supra 
note 1, at 421. 
 11. Both tribunals have their critics. See, e.g., BULL, supra note 2, at 89 (“The 
world . . . after the Second World War witnessed the trial and punishment of German and 
Japanese leaders and soldiers for war crimes and crimes against the peace. . . . That these men 
and not others were brought to trial by the victors was [selective and] an accident of power 
politics.”); Bert V.A. Röling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in 1 A 
TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590–615 (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda 
eds., 1973) (contending that the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were one-sided and were often 
used to achieve political and propagandistic ends). 
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such but as a real ‘international crime’” for which individuals could be 
prosecuted and punished.12 The tribunals’ promising legacy has, 
however, been left unfulfilled. Since 1947, no one has been 
prosecuted for an alleged crime of aggression.13 
The greatest impediment to effective prosecution of aggression 
has been the international community’s inability to define the 
offense.14 Even the Nuremburg judges committed little ink to 
outlining the contours of the crime, grounding their conclusion that 
Germany had conducted a war of aggression largely on that country’s 
history of autocratic governance and its desire to disrupt the status 
quo embodied in the Treaty of Versailles.15 Since 1947, there have 
been several attempts to define aggression,16 but none have 
succeeded. The international community came close in 1974, when 
the U.N. General Assembly adopted a comprehensive definition.17 
But the General Assembly’s formulation was not legally binding on 
U.N. member states and had no noticeable effect on decisionmaking 
within the U.N. Security Council.18 Moreover, the General 
 
 12. Danilo Zolo, Who Is Afraid of Punishing Aggressors?: On the Double-Track Approach 
to International Criminal Justice, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 799, 800 (2007). 
 13. Id. at 799. 
 14. See Rome Statute of the ICC art. 5, para. 2, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered 
into force July 1, 2002) (“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once 
a provision is adopted . . . defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”); BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 
Reconciling Legitimate Concerns and Removing the Lock From the Courthouse Door (May 
2008), http://www.benferencz.org/index.php?id=4&article=9 (“Aggression was included [in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC] as one of the four ‘core crimes’ but the ICC was prohibited from 
exercising jurisdiction over that offense . . . [because] the intransigent aggression problem was 
pushed to a back burner for later consideration . . . at a Review Conference which could deal 
with the definition . . . .”). 
 15. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, 
supra note 1, at 413–49 (detailing the rise of the Nazi party and Germany’s acts of war in 
violation of international treaties); Sabine Swoboda, Defining Aggression and the Objectives of a 
Crime of Aggression, 19 CRIM. L.F. 319, 322 (2008) (book review) (“[The International Military 
Tribunal] merely underlined Germany’s history and character as an autocratic military regime, 
its undemocratic internal constitution and Germany’s pursuit of the political aim of disrupting 
the world order as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) (declaring 
the General Assembly’s adoption of a “Definition of Aggression”); Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind art. 16, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 51 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 9, U.N. 
Doc. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 
(providing a definition for the “crime of aggression”). 
 17. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 16. 
 18. Sergey Sayapin, A Great Unknown: The Definition of Aggression Revisited, 17 MICH. 
ST. J. INT’L L. 377, 378 (2008); see also Ferencz, supra note 6, at 556 (“[T]he 1974 consensus 
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Assembly’s definition is too steeped in Cold War–era concepts to 
carry any normative relevance today.19 The 1998 Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) listed aggression among 
the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, but it left the elements 
of the offense unspecified.20 The delegates at Rome instead provided 
that the ASP must amend the Statute if it were to include a proper 
definition of the crime.21 
Despite these struggles, the international community once again 
set out to define the crime of aggression. In 2002, the ASP established 
the Special Working Group to develop a definition of aggression that 
could be agreed upon by—and thus become legally binding on—the 
majority of states.22 At the June 2010 Kampala Review Conference, 
the Special Working Group presented to the ASP the product of 
near-decade-long negotiations. With the draft definition of aggression 
before it, the ASP moved quickly to do what the international 
community had hitherto failed to achieve. On June 11, 2010, the ASP 
adopted the first precise, enforceable definition of the crime.23 
The success of this endeavor was imperative. The greatest 
achievement of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals was clearly 
articulating that war making was no longer an inherent right of states, 
but rather an international crime under certain circumstances.24 That 
important legal advancement had to be sustained, for the crime of 
aggression remains one of the most critical concepts in international 
law.25 As a strictly legal matter, the legitimate use of force is restricted 
 
definition of aggression bound no one.”). General Assembly resolutions on matters of 
international peace and security are not legally binding on U.N. member states. See U.N. 
Charter art. 11, paras. 1, 2 (authorizing the General Assembly to make recommendations 
regarding “the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and 
security” and “any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security”); 
see generally C.J.R. Dugard, The Legal Effect of United Nations Resolutions on Apartheid, 83 S. 
AFR. L.J. 44, 46–48 (1966) (discussing the binding force of General Assembly resolutions).  
 19. See Ferencz, supra note 6, at 556 (“[The 1974 definition] reflected the fears, doubts, and 
hesitations of its time.”); Weisbord, supra note 4, at 22 (questioning whether certain aspects of 
the 1974 definition are normatively relevant in modern times, but not dismissing the 
formulation’s relevance altogether). 
 20. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, art. 5. 
 21. Id. art. 5, para. 2. 
 22. See The Crime of Aggression, COAL. FOR THE ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod= 
aggression (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (discussing the formation of the Special Working Group, 
as well as its purpose of continuing discussion of the definition of aggression). 
 23. See ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 8 bis (defining the crime of aggression).  
 24. Ferencz, supra note 6, at 565–66. 
 25. Alberto L. Zuppi, Aggression as International Crime: Unattainable Crusade or Finally 
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to individual or collective self-defense,26 unless authorized by the 
Security Council.27 All other uses of force must therefore be 
prohibited by law and punished in court.28 Benjamin B. Ferencz, a 
former prosecutor at Nuremberg, stressed this point on a normative 
level: 
If peace is to be protected, it is essential that all national leaders be 
aware that individuals responsible for the crime of aggression will be 
held criminally accountable before the bar of international 
justice . . . . Unauthorized war-making is neither legal nor 
inevitable. . . . Many great military leaders have come to recognize 
that nations can no longer rely on the use of force but must turn to 
the rule of law if they are to survive. New forms of violence and 
terror pose increasing threats that emphasize the need for new 
thinking. As part of the movement toward a more just and humane 
world, those responsible for aggression must learn that they will no 
longer be immune . . . .29 
The task before the ASP was indeed a vital one. Failure to adopt a 
workable definition would have extended to aggressors “a renewed 
license to wage illegal wars” with judicial impunity and would have 
sacrificed the combined efforts of the past sixty years.30 
Yet despite the promise the new definition represents, there is 
reason for pause. As presently written, the definition of aggression 
focuses solely on state actors, providing, in relevant part, that the 
“crime of aggression” means the planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
 
Conquering the Evil?, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). 
 26. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 27. Id. art. 39. 
 28. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 281, 288–89 (2009) (noting that the Security Council is institutionally incapable 
of remedying all breaches of international peace and that violent disputes are best adjudicated 
before a court of law). 
 29. Ferencz, supra note 6, at 566. Ferencz further recognizes that “punishing 
aggression . . . is an important component of a vast matrix which encompasses social justice, 
disarmament, and a system of effective enforcement,” all of which work toward eliminating 
wars. Id. Elsewhere, former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower similarly warned, “[T]he 
world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose 
the rule of law.” Statement by the President on the Observance of Law Day, 1958 PUB. PAPERS 
362, 363 (Apr. 30, 1958). 
 30. Ferencz, supra note 28, at 290; see also Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, pmbl. 
(“[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go 
unpunished and . . . their effective prosecution must be ensured . . . to put an end to impunity for 
the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes . . . .”). 
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over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of 
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a 
manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.31 
The definition further refines the concept of an “act of aggression,” 
noting that it entails “the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations.”32 
This definition is anachronistic, dangerous, and unworkable.33 Its 
exclusive focus on state behavior creates an overly restricted 
conception of the crime that cannot be applied to the present reality 
of international armed conflict. Modern aggression is increasingly 
perpetrated by nonstate actors whose nature and characteristics place 
them outside the most widely accepted definition of the state. Even 
abandoning this traditional conception of statehood for a constructive 
interpretation cannot guarantee that the definition will encompass all 
relevant nonstate actors. Furthermore, applying a constructive 
interpretation of statehood to nonstate actors will generate one of 
two deleterious effects. If the constructive interpretation extends 
statehood to nonstate groups in the limited context of the Rome 
Statute, it will create an uncertain international environment in which 
a political entity can be simultaneously a state and a nonstate, and it 
will violate the fundamental principle of state sovereign equality. 
Alternatively, if the constructive interpretation extends statehood to 
nonstate groups in all contexts, it will inhibit the prosecution of 
aggression by entitling leaders of nonstate groups to sovereign 
immunity, and it will hamper efforts to eliminate international 
terrorism by granting terrorist organizations the right of self-
preservation. Consequently, the ASP should rewrite the new 
definition of aggression to expressly include both states and nonstate 
groups.34 This proposal would ensure that the definition is sufficiently 
 
 31. ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 8 bis, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. Annex I, art. 8 bis, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
 33. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 34. For example, the definition should read: “the ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of a State or a Nonstate Group, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.” Similarly, an act of aggression should be defined as “the use of armed force by 
a State or a Nonstate Group against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
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flexible to encompass the primary threat to international peace and 
security today—terrorism. 
II.  SHIFTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 
The structure of warfare is evolving. Though some commentators 
contend that the state remains an important, if no longer a dominant, 
actor,35 the shift away from state centrism and toward a more 
decentralized form of conflict is evident.36 As U.S. counterterrorism 
expert John Robb notes, “[W]ars between states are now, for all 
intents and purposes, obsolete.”37 Instead, “[t]he real threat” is the 
rapid rise in global terrorism and the emergence of the independent, 
superempowered group.38 Corroborating Robb’s prediction, Thomas 
X. Hammes, a retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel, observes, “[T]here 
have been major changes in who fights wars. The trend has been and 
continues to be downward from nation-states using huge, uniformed 
armies to small groups of like-minded people with no formal 
organization who simply choose to fight.”39 
With the continuing decline of state-on-state warfare, 
independent terrorist organizations represent perhaps the greatest 
threat to international peace and security.40 As demonstrated by the 
 
United Nations.” 
 35. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 126, 146 (2008) (noting that asymmetric warfare is becoming the norm but 
suggesting that states will remain key players in international armed conflict, albeit in a different 
form). 
 36. See generally Weisbord, supra note 4, at 13–20 (providing an excellent and thorough 
summary of the structural, organizational, and methodological shifts warfare has undergone in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries). 
 37. JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STAGE OF TERRORISM AND THE END OF 
GLOBALIZATION 7 (2007). 
 38. Id. Contra Tim Stephens, International Criminal Law and the Response to International 
Terrorism, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 454, 454 (2004) (“[T]he available statistics suggest that [terrorism] 
presents a less significant challenge to world order and wellbeing than is often supposed, and 
must therefore be kept in perspective alongside countless other global challenges to human 
security . . . .”). 
 39. T.X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, MILITARY REV., 
May–June 2007, at 14, 20. 
 40. As used in this Note, “independent terrorist organizations” are those groups that are 
not merely extensions of a state. They may be sheltered, financed, or otherwise assisted by a 
state. They may be subject to a state’s laws and legal system, whether theoretically or in 
practice. But they operate independently of the state itself. Organizations like al Qaeda would 
be considered independent, whereas groups like Hamas would not. This Note is concerned 
exclusively with independent, non-state-sponsored terrorist organizations. 
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September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States; the July 7, 2005, 
attacks on the London transit system; and the bombings of trains in 
Spain and India on March 11, 2004, and July 11, 2006, respectively, 
independent terrorist groups are capable of inflicting significant harm 
on the states, communities, and individuals they target. Some, like al 
Qaeda, can launch attacks whose devastation rivals the military 
capabilities of many states.41 For others, it is only a matter of time. 
“[A]s the leverage provided by technology increases,” Robb 
forecasts, the threat posed by international terrorism “will finally 
reach its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on 
the world and win.”42 
The rise of global terrorism has cast doubt on the continued 
relevance of international law.43 Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan recognized the mounting crisis of faith in the international 
system, declaring before the General Assembly in 2003, “We have 
come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive 
than in 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. . . . Now we 
must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed 
then, or whether radical changes are needed.”44 Fundamentally, the 
task of defining the crime of aggression is an exercise in adaptation, 
reforming the international legal system to address contemporary 
threats to international peace and security.45 To this end, the present 
definition is inadequate. Terrorism is essentially a belligerent 
activity46 equivalent to the state-on-state violence proscribed by the 
current conception of aggression.47 Therefore, terrorist organizations 
and like-minded groups should be expressly included in the definition 
of that offense. 
 
 41. See Mark A. Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the 
Gains?, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 306–07 (2009) (asserting that systemic attacks by 
nonstate actors like al Qaeda pose major threats to the international interests protected by 
criminalizing aggression: stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty). 
 42. ROBB, supra note 37, at 8. 
 43. Devika Hovell, Chinks in the Armour: International Law, Terrorism and the Use of 
Force, 27 U. N.S.W. L.J. 398, 398 (2004). 
 44. U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.7 (Sept. 23, 2003). 
 45. Cf. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, pmbl. (“[T]he most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community [including war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and aggression] . . . must not go unpunished and . . . their effective prosecution must 
be ensured . . . to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes . . . .”). 
 46. Caleb Carr, “Terrorism”: Why the Definition Must Be Broad, WORLD POL’Y J., Spring 
2007, at 47, 47. 
 47. Drumbl, supra note 41, at 306–07. 
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Recognizing the “sociological changes in the character of 
modern war,” Professor Weisbord agrees that the new definition 
should be applied to nonstate groups.48 Rather than expressly include 
these entities in the definition of aggression, however, he contends 
that so long as they possess statelike characteristics, the best course is 
to interpret the definition’s use of the term “State” constructively to 
encompass them.49 The reasoning is sound. The delegates to the ASP 
are reluctant to reopen the debate when widespread acceptance of 
the current formulation has been achieved. Weisbord’s novel 
approach heeds these political concerns by infusing enough flexibility 
into the definition to allow it to adapt while largely preserving its 
original focus on state action.50 
But this solution is problematic. Nonstate groups should be 
explicitly included in the definition of aggression alongside, but 
distinguishable from, states. Otherwise, the definition cannot be given 
proper effect because most independent terrorist organizations lack 
the characteristics necessary for classification as a state.51 
III.  MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF STATEHOOD AND THEIR 
INAPPLICABILITY TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
It is easy to understand why many equate global terrorist 
organizations with the political and territorial entities traditionally 
considered states. Not only can they operate on the international 
plane in ways similar to many states—and often more effectively52—
but they also possess many of the attributes associated with 
statehood. They are often well-funded and well-organized, command 
trained and willing forces, and have the potential to unleash 
devastating attacks whose character and scale would constitute a 
violation of the U.N. Charter if perpetrated by a state.53 Some 
terrorist organizations, like Hamas and Hezbollah, have even gained 
significant governmental power.54 Moreover, state officials have 
 
 48. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 27. 
 49. Id. at 30. 
 50. Id. at 29–30. 
 51. See infra Part III. 
 52. LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 306 (2008). 
 53. See Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use of 
Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 97, 109, 115 (2003) (discussing the nature and characteristics of 
modern terrorist organizations). 
 54. Hamas has successfully wrested control of the Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip 
from other political parties. MAY, supra note 52, at 306. 
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blurred the distinction between these groups and their state 
supporters. Addressing the nation immediately following the events 
of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush resolved to “make 
no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and 
those who harbor them.”55 Echoing his superior’s call, Vice President 
Dick Cheney warned that “if you provide sanctuary to terrorists, you 
face the full wrath of the United States of America.”56 
Being similar to a state, however, is not the same as being a state. 
“Since the development of the modern international system, 
statehood has been regarded as the paramount type of international 
personality . . . .”57 It both implies a particular legal status and confers 
a panoply of rights and obligations that do not attach to nonstate 
actors. As demonstrated in the remainder of this Part, both legal and 
policy arguments militate against confounding terrorist organizations 
with states.58 
A.  Difficulties Inherent in Classifying Terrorist Organizations as 
States under the Montevideo Convention 
Though statelike in many respects, international terrorist 
organizations lack the indicia that are legally dispositive of statehood. 
Perhaps the clearest and most widely accepted definition of statehood 
was adopted in Uruguay on December 26, 1933, in the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo 
Convention).59 Article 1 enumerates four qualities that all states 
should possess: (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, 
(3) an effective government, and (4) the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.60 Though the product of a regional 
agreement, these criteria have developed into customary 
international law and become a touchstone for the definition of a 
 
 55. President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11, 2001). 
 56. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2001) (transcript available at http:// 
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20010916 
.html). 
 57. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ix (2d ed. 
2006). 
 58. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 59. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 
19; see also Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its 
Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403, 415 (1999) (“[C]itation to the Convention in 
contemporary discussions of statehood is nearly a reflex.” (footnote omitted)). 
 60. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, art. 1. 
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state.61 Until they are supplanted as the authoritative statement of 
customary law on the subject, they should be employed to determine 
statehood whenever that designation is in question.62 Under these 
four requirements, however, independent terrorist organizations do 
not qualify as states. To illustrate this conclusion, this Section will 
consider each element and its inapplicability to terrorist groups. 
1. Permanent Population.  States are inherently “aggregates of 
individuals,” and no state can exist without a permanent population.63 
In general, the bounds of this requirement are flexible. Neither the 
Montevideo Convention nor customary international law mandates a 
minimum population size,64 and the international community does not 
require that a population be settled to be considered permanent.65 
Under this criterion, a region inhabited entirely by wandering 
nomads, for example, would be as eligible for statehood as any 
other.66 In at least one important respect, however, this first 
requirement is strict: an entity’s population must reside within some 
territory over which that entity has exclusive governmental control.67 
2. Defined Territory.  In addition to being a collection of 
individual citizens, states are fundamentally “territorial entities.”68 
And as with the requirement of a permanent population, the 
strictures placed on this territorial prerequisite are few. Borders need 
not be clearly defined or undisputed, and the territory need not be 
 
 61. See JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-
COLONIAL ‘NATIONAL’ IDENTITY 77 (2000) (“The Montevideo Convention is considered to be 
reflecting, in general terms, the requirements of statehood in customary international law.”). 
 62. But see Grant, supra note 59, at 434–47 (acknowledging that some authors question the 
normative reach of the Montevideo Convention and summarizing the main challenges to its 
general applicability). 
 63. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 52. 
 64. See JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 83 (3d 
ed. 2005) (noting that no minimum population is required for statehood). 
 65. Pamela Epstein, Behind Closed Doors: “Autonomous Colonization” in Post United 
Nations Era—The Case for Western Sahara, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 119–20 
(2009). 
 66. Id. at 120. 
 67. See Lucian C. Martinez, Jr., Sovereign Impunity: Does the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act Bar Lawsuits Against the Holy See in Clerical Sexual Abuse Cases?, 44 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 123, 149 (2008) (“If the territorial element of sovereignty is absent, the requirement 
of a permanent population is at best abstract.”). 
 68. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 46. 
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contiguous.69 Nor is there any minimum area over which an entity 
must exercise full governmental control.70 Indeed, Vatican City—the 
world’s smallest state—possesses a mere 0.25 square miles.71 
Despite these lax conditions, however, independent terrorist 
organizations—including al Qaeda, the most formidable among 
them—cannot fulfill the territorial requirement. They persist instead 
in a parasitic relationship with a host state that is unwilling or unable 
to dislodge them. A “condition of [the] organizational existence” of 
independent terrorist groups, writes Professor Philip B. Heymann, is 
“a sheltering country such as Syria, Iraq, or Iran.”72 The terrorists who 
executed the attacks of September 11 “needed a haven, Afghanistan, 
that would permit the planning and financing of an attack.”73 
Somewhere, terrorists must develop their plans, store their weapons 
and provisions, train, house, and feed their fighters, and hide their 
leaders.74 In short, they must operate from the territory of some state, 
for independent terrorist organizations possess none of their own.75 
3. Effective Government.  Even assuming that a terrorist 
organization could claim a permanent population and a defined 
region, it could not qualify as a state unless it exercised full 
governmental control over its territory, independent of any external 
authority.76 International law does not specify any particular form, 
nature, or extent of this control, but it does mandate that a state 
government maintain at least some degree of law and order and 
establish basic institutions.77 Unlike states, independent terrorist 
organizations are concerned with neither of these goals. They are “led 
by individuals who . . . display an utter disregard for both human life 
and the rule of law.”78 Perhaps more importantly, the illegality of their 
existence dictates that they must maintain secrecy to evade capture.79 
 
 69. DUGARD, supra note 64, at 83. 
 70. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 46. 
 71. See id. at 47 tbl.1 (noting that Vatican City possesses 0.4 square kilometers). 
 72. Philip B. Heymann, Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview, 26 INT’L SECURITY 24, 25 
(2001). 
 73. Id. at 26. 
 74. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98. 
 75. Id. 
 76. DUGARD, supra note 64, at 83–84. 
 77. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 59. 
 78. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 115. 
 79. Heymann, supra note 72, at 28, 33–37. 
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Terrorist organizations are consequently highly decentralized entities 
with no permanent institutions, infrastructure, or any other indicia of 
a coherent form of overarching government.80 Al Qaeda, for instance, 
is comprised of “hundreds of mercurial cells”81 that form “a loosely 
knit, diffuse, informal network, spread over many countries.”82 In 
short, the objectives and organizational structure of terrorist groups 
are readily distinguishable from those of any known form of viable 
state government. Effective governmental control, however, 
represents the central element of statehood, for it is the criterion on 
which the other three indicia depend.83 As such, the inability of 
independent terrorist organizations to meet this requirement is 
particularly dispositive of their disqualification for statehood.84 
4. Capacity to Enter into Relations with Other States.  Finally, to 
be considered a state, a political entity must possess the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. Although this power is no 
longer an exclusive state prerogative,85 it nonetheless remains a useful 
criterion insofar as it combines the requirement of governmental 
control with an element of independence.86 As the former has been 
elucidated already,87 only the latter will be discussed here. 
 
 80. See Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1799 (2005) (“It is unlikely . . . that members of a single Al Qaeda cell 
will know of the existence, much less the particular activities, of any other cell; that is the very 
point of organizing a movement into a clandestine network of cells.”); Weisbord, supra note 4, 
at 16 (“It is less complex to attack a government, which has permanent institutions and 
infrastructure, than the hundreds of mercurial cells that make up al Qaeda.”); Meet the Press, 
supra note 56 (noting that while Osama bin Laden organized and heads al Qaeda, it is really “a 
very broad, kind of loose coalition of groupings”). 
 81. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 16. 
 82. Osiel, supra note 80, at 1799. See generally DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE 
AGE OF SACRED TERROR: RADICAL ISLAM’S WAR AGAINST AMERICA 167–70 (2003) 
(describing the evolution of al Qaeda’s organizational structure and highlighting its lack of 
discernable command and control). 
 83. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 56. 
 84. See id. at 62 (“Independence is the central criterion for statehood.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 85. See Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of 
International Organizations, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 123 (1970) (“International 
organizations have concluded treaties, . . . convened international conferences with 
representatives of States and other international organizations, . . . sent diplomatic 
representatives to member and nonmember States and received permanent missions from 
member States.”). 
 86. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 62. 
 87. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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Independence is comprised of two subelements. The first is the 
entity’s separate existence within the international community, borne 
out by the exercise of effective governmental control over a 
permanent population and a defined territory.88 As previously 
explained, terrorist organizations can rarely fulfill these conditions.89 
Nor can they demonstrate the second subelement of independence—
freedom from the authority of another state.90 Although terrorist 
groups may be independent insofar as their operations are not 
dictated by any particular state, the existence of most such 
organizations is predicated on the willingness of states to support and 
shelter them.91 The U.S. Congress implicitly recognized this when it 
authorized the use of military force against both terrorist 
organizations and the states that assist them.92 Other terrorist 
organizations operate within the borders of a state that is unaware of 
their existence or unable to control their presence. Regardless of 
which scenario prevails, all of these entities are necessarily within the 
domain of a state and are therefore subject to external control.93 An 
entity may demonstrate considerable freedom in both internal and 
external affairs and yet remain formally dependent on another entity 
and subject to that other entity’s control.94 
Furthermore, the level of independence an entity must 
demonstrate is heavily dependent on context. According to Professor 
James Crawford, “it is important to distinguish independence as an 
initial qualification for statehood and as a condition for continued 
existence. A new State . . . will have to demonstrate substantial 
independence . . . before it will be regarded as definitively created,” 
whereas an existing one will not.95 An independent terrorist 
organization would have to be recognized as a new state and would 
 
 88. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 66. 
 89. See supra Part III.A.1–3. 
 90. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 66. 
 91. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 
224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)) (“[T]he President is authorized to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”). 
 93. See Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98 (noting that terrorist organizations must 
operate from “the territory of some state”). 
 94. CRAWFORD, supra note 57, at 66. 
 95. Id. at 63. 
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thus carry a heavy burden to prove its independence. Given the 
numerous factors weighing against independence for terrorist 
organizations, few would surmount this obstacle. 
In sum, whether an international terrorist organization can fulfill 
these four widely accepted characteristics of statehood is doubtful. 
Not only do these entities frequently lack a permanent population 
and a defined territory, but they also rarely display the governmental 
control and independence that represent the most vital elements of 
statehood. Unable to meet any of the four requirements of the 
Montevideo Convention, most terrorist organizations cannot be 
considered states. 
B.  Difficulties Inherent in Applying a Dynamic Conception 
of Statehood 
Because the four criteria of the Montevideo Convention 
collectively represent the customary and most widely recognized 
benchmarks of statehood, they should be used to interpret the term 
“State” in the definition of aggression. Yet the law governing the 
creation of states is exceedingly complex,96 and the four factors 
enumerated in 1933 have been the subject of intense scrutiny.97 
Although numerous scholars have argued that a mechanical 
application of the Montevideo Convention is not alone dispositive of 
statehood, most avoid supplanting the Convention altogether, 
choosing instead to de-emphasize some of its criteria while appending 
new ones.98 But at least one academic commentator suggests that it is 
outright irrelevant. Professor Philip Bobbitt, a renowned military 
historian and legal scholar, argues that “[t]he State has undergone 
many transformations in . . . the basis for [its] legitimacy . . . [and n]ow 
it is about to undergo another.”99 Bobbitt inquires whether al Qaeda 
 
 96. See id. at x (recognizing that numerous factors beyond mere effectiveness must be 
considered); DUGARD, supra note 64, at 82–83 (suggesting that emerging states must now 
demonstrate compliance with the standards and expectations of the international community on 
issues of human rights and self-determination in addition to the traditional criteria of the 
Montevideo Convention); William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the 
State in State Recognition Theory, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 115, 158 (2009) (acknowledging that there 
is a lack of consensus within the international community on the criteria for statehood). 
 97. See generally Grant, supra note 59, at 434–47 (surveying the charges levied against the 
Montevideo Convention). 
 98. See id. at 434–53 (outlining the approaches of several different schools of thought and 
implicitly demonstrating that none rejects the Montevideo Convention completely). 
 99. BOBBITT, supra note 35, at 126. 
M. ANDERSON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 10/17/2010  10:18:02 PM 
428 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:411 
could exemplify this new concept of statehood.100 Professor Weisbord 
responds in the affirmative, arguing that “Bobbitt’s dynamic 
conception of the state may offer diplomats drafting the definition of 
the crime [of aggression] and jurists interpreting it a way to include 
acts by al Qaeda-like groups within its ambit.”101 For the reasons set 
forth in this Section, this view is not as promising as it initially 
appears; in fact, it carries several adverse effects. Thus, the scope of 
the term “State” as used in the definition of aggression should instead 
be restricted by close adherence to the Montevideo Convention. 
Professor Bobbitt asserts that statehood is based on 
constitutional orders and that those orders invariably change when 
the foundations on which they rest are no longer viable.102 The 
dominant constitutional order today is the nation-state, which is built 
on maximizing the welfare of its people.103 To fulfill this promise, the 
nation-state must guarantee national security and shield its society 
from transnational perils.104 The shift in strategic threats facing 
states,105 however, has undermined their ability to achieve those 
ends.106 As Bobbitt observes, “Bandits, robbers, guerillas, [and] gangs 
have always been part of the domestic security environment. What is 
new is their access to mechanized weapons . . . and the unique 
political role of such groups . . . . Against these threats, the nation-
state is too muscle-bound and too much observed to be of much 
use.”107 As a result, the present constitutional order is slowly decaying, 
and “a new form is being born.”108 That new form is the market-state, 
a constitutional order premised not on securing the welfare of the 
people, but on maximizing the opportunities available to them.109 
What exactly constitutes opportunity maximization depends on the 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 15. 
 102. See PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF 
HISTORY 346–47 (2002) (providing a graphical outline of Bobbitt’s thesis); cf. id. at 213 (“The 
reason that the constitutional order of the nation-state is undergoing a transformation is that it 
faces a crisis of legitimation.”). 
 103. Id. at 61–63. 
 104. Id. at 228. 
 105. See supra Part II. 
 106. See BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 16–17 (observing that the new strategic environment 
that now prevails has a significant impact on the state and is causing the nation-state to wither). 
 107. Id. at 219. 
 108. Id. at 17. 
 109. Id. at 229. 
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shared values of a particular political entity.110 If opportunity 
maximization is the sole indication of statehood in this new 
constitutional order, then terrorist organizations are correctly 
captured by the term “State” in the definition of aggression. These 
groups are political entities whose members share common values 
and objectives, however reprehensible they may be. As such, terrorist 
organizations can be said to maximize opportunities for their 
adherents and therefore to qualify as states. But to reach this 
conclusion is to commit two errors. First, it is to discount another 
indicium of state legitimacy that has not faltered with the passing of 
the nation-state: the legitimate use of violence. Second, it is to ignore 
the widely divergent forms that terrorism can adopt and the 
consequent difficulty of capturing them all within a coherent 
conception of statehood. This Section considers each in turn. 
Professor Bobbitt stresses throughout his work the importance of 
violence in the rise and fall of constitutional orders and the existence 
of states within them. Encapsulating this argument, he contends that 
“[t]he constitutional order of a state and its strategic posture toward 
other states together form the inner and outer membrane of a state. 
That membrane is secured by violence; without that security, a state 
ceases to exist.”111 A political entity, however, must exercise force in 
accordance with the strictures of international law: “What is 
distinctive about the State is the requirement that the violence it 
deploys on its behalf must be legitimate; that is, it must be accepted 
within as a matter of law, and accepted without as an appropriate act 
of state sovereignty.”112 
The violence employed by terrorist organizations does not meet 
this requirement. Although it may be accepted within a terrorist 
organization—and without, by similar collectives and a few states—
the international community as a whole has denounced terrorist 
violence as per se illegitimate. In December 1984, for example, the 
General Assembly, the only U.N. organ in which all member states 
have equal representation, passed Resolution 39/159, which 
“[r]esolutely condemns policies and practices of terrorism in relations 
between States as a method of dealing with other States and 
peoples.”113 By the end of the following year, the General Assembly 
 
 110. See id. at 669 (giving examples of different conceptions of opportunity maximization). 
 111. Id. at 16–17. 
 112. Id. at 17. 
 113. G.A. Res. 39/159, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/159 (Dec. 17, 1984). 
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had extended an unequivocal denunciation to all acts of international 
terrorism.114 With a Comprehensive Convention on the International 
Suppression of Terrorism currently being drafted,115 it is evident that 
the international community’s stance on global terrorism has not 
weakened. Unable to exercise legitimate force, a terrorist 
organization cannot secure the constitutional order and strategic 
posture necessary to be considered a state under Bobbitt’s 
construction. 
Second, even if Professor Bobbitt’s interpretation of statehood 
successfully captured some current nonstate groups, it is too narrow 
to encompass all of them. The author himself emphasizes that “just 
what particular form of the State ultimately emerges from” the 
transition between the nation- and the market-state “cannot 
confidently be predicted.”116 That some formidable groups of political 
dissidents will remain outside the new constitutional order is 
unavoidable, for although the underlying basis of state legitimacy has 
evolved over time,117 international terrorism has persisted as a largely 
nonstate-driven phenomenon.118 Thus, it is unlikely that most terrorist 
organizations would be captured in a dynamic theory of statehood: 
[Terrorism exists] in different shapes and contexts, with different 
actors and different modes of operation. When it seemed that the 
only kind of terrorism we should focus upon was the global 
‘innovative’ terrorism of September 11, the recent events in Iraq, 
Palestine, and Lebanon remind us that . . . the plague of terrorism 
can become virulent and acute after periods of dormancy, and that it 
can reappear with mutant strains, against which antibodies and 
existing drugs turn out to be impotent.119 
Because “the same concept of ‘terrorism’ is applied to radically 
different phenomena,” capturing each of its iterations in a single 
 
 114. G.A. Res. 40/61, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (Dec. 9, 1985) (“[The General Assembly] 
[u]nequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism wherever 
and by whomever committed . . . .”). 
 115. U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 55th Sess., Agenda Item 166, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/55/1 (Aug. 28, 
2000). 
 116. BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 233. 
 117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International 
Terrorism, 27 INT’L SECURITY 30, 34–42 (2002) (discussing the origins and historical evolution 
of international terrorism). 
 119. Roberto Toscano, A War Against What?, WORLD POL’Y J., Spring 2007, at 40, 40. 
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model of statehood is impossible.120 Abandoning the Montevideo 
Convention in favor of Bobbitt’s dynamic conception of statehood 
thus provides no guarantee that all terrorist organizations will be 
included within the definition of aggression. Some will inevitably 
remain beyond the fray. 
Consequently, a definition of the crime of aggression that makes 
exclusive reference to state behavior will not extend to these entities. 
This outcome would be acceptable if terrorist organizations 
traditionally posed little danger to the existence of sovereign states, 
with the modern threats representing a historical anomaly that will be 
erased by the emergence of the market-state. Professor Bobbitt’s own 
extensive survey of the historical record, however, demonstrates that 
international terrorism has not lain dormant since its ancient 
inception, but instead has thrived in its ability to challenge the 
survival of states, irrespective of their form.121 From Gavrilo Princip’s 
assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, to Osama bin 
Laden’s attacks of September 11, international terrorism has 
repeatedly sparked the epochal wars to which Bobbitt attributes the 
shifts in constitutional order.122 Hence, even if one interpreted “State” 
dynamically, there is every indication that the terrorist groups 
excluded from its reach would be able to threaten the new market-
state as well. The definition of aggression should therefore be 
expanded to expressly account for them. 
In short, Professor Bobbitt’s unique understanding of statehood 
provides little assistance to those who would attempt to use a 
dynamic conception of the state to generate flexibility in the 
definition of aggression. Bobbitt’s approach ignores the fact that 
many nonstate entities—including terrorist organizations—cannot 
legitimately use force and leaves at least some potential nonstate 
aggressors beyond the definition’s reach. Whether terrorist 
 
 120. Id. Evincing the difficulty of capturing all forms of terrorism in a single definition, the 
Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism defines the phenomenon with 
regard to the acts that terrorists commit—death or serious bodily harm, or serious damage to a 
state or government facility or to public infrastructure, caused with the intent of intimidating a 
population or compelling a government or international organization to act or refrain from 
acting—rather than with regard to any organizational attributes that terrorist groups share. U.N. 
GAOR 6th Comm., supra note 115, art. 2, para. 1. 
 121. See BOBBITT, supra note 102, at 346–47 (demonstrating that the rise and fall of 
constitutional orders has historically coincided with, and been dictated by, the outcome of 
epochal wars). 
 122. See id. (listing the epochal wars sparked by these events and illustrating their 
connection with the rise and fall of constitutional orders). 
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organizations can be considered states is as questionable under this 
approach as it is under the Montevideo Convention. What is more, 
any reinterpretation—or outright abandonment—of the Convention 
for use in the definition of aggression should be avoided. Although 
developed outside the international criminal law context,123 the 
multifactor test established by the Montevideo Convention remains 
the most widely accepted formulation of statehood.124 Applying the 
Convention, however, generates problems of its own. Not only do 
independent terrorist organizations by their nature fall outside the 
Convention’s parameters,125 but forcing them into that framework also 
threatens to undermine the notion of statehood in international law 
and jeopardizes efforts to prosecute aggression and combat terrorism. 
IV.  DANGERS OF CONFERRING STATEHOOD UPON  
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
The consequences of classifying terrorist organizations as states 
suggest that the ASP should reconsider the new definition. 
Regardless of how it is applied in practice, the current formulation 
carries drawbacks that militate strongly against its use. On the one 
hand, extending statehood to terrorist groups for the limited purpose 
of prosecution before the ICC generates uncertainty in the 
international system and undermines the equality of states. But on 
the other, the alternative of conferring statehood on terrorist 
organizations for all purposes endangers both the effective 
prosecution of aggression and the long-term success of the 
international community’s battle against terrorism. In light of these 
challenges, the ASP should amend the new definition of aggression 
and its exclusive reference to state behavior and should instead 
explicitly include both states and nonstate groups within the scope of 
the offense. 
A.  Risks Posed by Conferring Limited Statehood 
Professor Weisbord notes that no one believes that the ICC can 
independently confer statehood. Using the definition of aggression as 
presently written, ICC judges would instead determine an entity’s 
 
 123. See Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, pmbl. (stating that the 
agreement was an effort to outline the rights and duties of states); Grant, supra note 59, at 414–
18 (tracing the origins and development of the Montevideo requirements). 
 124. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra Part III.A. 
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status as a state strictly for the purpose of criminal prosecution before 
the court.126 For two significant reasons, this restricted approach is 
flawed. 
Although signed in 1933, the Montevideo Convention still 
provides the most widely accepted definition of statehood.127 
Producing a new framework for exclusive use in international 
criminal law risks creating what renowned international legal scholar 
Hersch Lauterpacht described as a “grotesque spectacle”128—namely, 
a legal milieu in which an entity is simultaneously a state and a 
nonstate.129 It leaves the international community to wonder which 
legal status prevails in which contexts. Such ambiguity is undesirable 
in an international system predicated on order and stability.130 Not 
only is this uncertainty a “grave reflection upon international law” 
that counsels strongly against developing a new concept of statehood 
for use exclusively with the Rome Statute,131 but interpreting 
statehood differently in different contexts also violates sovereign 
equality. 
The equality of states is a foundational principle of international 
law.132 Some legal theorists attribute its existence to the inherent 
quality of the state as an international person. Others avoid the 
difficulty of pinpointing its origins and merely accept its existence.133 
Whatever its roots, the meaning of sovereign equality is clear: all 
political entities considered states possess equal rights and 
 
 126. E-mail from Noah Weisbord, Visiting Assistant Professor, Duke Univ. School of Law, 
to Author (Jan. 7, 2010) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 127. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 128. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1947). 
 129. Commenting on a previous draft of this Note, Professor Weisbord cautioned that 
perhaps it is not the definition of aggression that is antiquated, but rather the Montevideo 
Convention. Whether this is accurate is somewhat beside the point. The task of the ASP was not 
to reformulate the conception of statehood, but to adopt a definition of aggression that accords 
with accepted international law. Supplementing that definition with a special test for 
determining statehood risks creating uncertainty in other contexts in which statehood is not 
specifically defined. See DUGARD, supra note 64, at 91 (observing that classifying an entity as a 
state in some contexts but not in others generates unwanted ambiguity). Given that a generally 
accepted definition of a state already exists, if it is to be modernized, it should be done through 
the agreement of the international community as a whole. 
 130. Id.; see also BULL, supra note 2, at 96–97 (noting that order in social life is a necessary 
condition for secondary goals like justice). 
 131. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 128, at 78. 
 132. EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 
(1920). 
 133. See id. at 101–03 (summarizing the views of prominent publicists on the origin and 
existence of sovereign equality). 
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obligations.134 Practical reality, however, dictates that such absolute 
equality is impossible.135 The proper understanding of sovereign 
equality is therefore that “all [states] have potentially the same rights, 
that they have an equal power of realizing them, and that they ought 
to be able to [realize and] exercise them with the same 
inviolability.”136 Classifying terrorist organizations as states exclusively 
for prosecution before the ICC, as Professor Weisbord suggests the 
ICC judges will do, directly contradicts this accepted norm. It confers 
upon these groups the duties and obligations of statehood with none 
of the rights, relegating them to a position of inferiority. 
This effect is neither just nor valid under international law. 
Irrespective of the comparative size or strength of states, any 
superiority or limitation not common to all is unlawful.137 “What is 
lawful or unjust for one state,” agreed Argentine publicist and 
historian Carlos Calvo, “is equally lawful or unjust for all other states, 
regardless of which states are powerful or which states possess only a 
secondary rank.”138 No characteristic can justify the slightest 
deprivation of the moral or juridical personality of a state.139 If 
terrorist organizations are to be considered states under the definition 
of aggression, they must be automatically entitled to every right 
attaching to that legal status. To conclude otherwise is to violate 
accepted norms of international law. Worse, it is to destroy the very 
foundations upon which the international system is built, for to 
violate the sovereign equality of states, Italian jurist Giuseppe 
Carnazza-Amari observed, “is to destroy the very constitution of 
human kind and of states.”140 
 
 134. Id. at 108 (quoting 1 PASQUALE FIORE, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
PUBBLICO 289 (4th ed. 1904)). 
 135. See id. at 106 (“Of course the publicists do not really mean that states have identical 
legal rights and obligations, for that is manifestly inconceivable.”). 
 136. Id. at 107 (quoting 2 PAUL PRADIER-FODÉRÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC EUROPÉEN ET AMÉRICAIN § 449 (Paris, G. Pedine-Launel 1885)). 
 137. Id. at 108 (quoting FIORE, supra note 134, at 289) (“Whether states are great or small, 
weak or strong, a superiority or limitation not common to all cannot be lawful.”). 
 138. CHARLES [CARLOS] CALVO, DICTIONNAIRE MANUEL DE DIPLOMATIE ET DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ET PRIVÉ 161 (Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2009) (1885) (translated from the 
French: “Ce qui est licite ou injuste pour un Etat l’est également pour tous les autres, sans 
distinction des nations qui sont puissantes ou de celles qui n’occupent qu’un rang 
secondaire . . . .” (Author’s translation)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. DICKINSON, supra note 132, at 107 (quoting GIUSEPPE CARNAZZA-AMARI, 
TRATTATO SUL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PUBBLICO DI PACE 278 (Milano, V. Maisner E. 
Compagnia Editori 2d ed. 1875)); see also BULL, supra note 2, at 91 (“The structure of 
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Defining the crime of aggression exclusively with regard to states 
and classifying terrorist organizations as such for prosecution before 
the ICC but for no other purpose is unjust and invalid. As the judicial 
embodiment of the international community, the ICC can ill afford to 
undermine the system it represents, particularly considering the 
court’s quest for legitimacy141 and the “mounting crisis of faith facing 
the international system.”142 But as demonstrated in this Section, 
developing a new concept of statehood for use exclusively with the 
Rome Statute does precisely that. ICC judges should therefore 
abandon this approach. If terrorist organizations are to be considered 
states under the definition of aggression, then they must be accorded 
statehood for all other purposes and with all attendant rights and 
obligations. Yet, although designating terrorist organizations as states 
in one context but not others should be avoided, the alternative—
conferring full statehood upon them—is equally undesirable. 
B.  Risks Posed by Conferring Complete Statehood 
Treating terrorist organizations as states in all contexts creates 
two substantial problems. First, it threatens the effective prosecution 
of aggression. The ICC’s jurisdictional constraints suggest that 
national legal systems must carry the primary responsibility for 
prosecuting aggression.143 In fact, the court is explicitly predicated on 
the primacy of national courts.144 If terrorist organizations were 
granted complete statehood, terrorist leaders who commit the crime 
of aggression would likely be able to bar domestic jurisdiction by 
invoking sovereign immunity and thus escape prosecution for their 
actions.145 Second, conferring complete statehood on terrorist groups 
 
international coexistence . . . itself depends on norms or rules conferring rights and duties upon 
states . . . .”). 
 141. This is demonstrated by the desperate concern for the court’s legitimacy conveyed by 
international legal scholars. See, e.g., Claus Kress, The Crime of Aggression Before the First 
Review of the ICC Statute, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 851, 862–63 (2007) (exploring legitimacy 
concerns in the context of aggression proceedings). 
 142. Hovell, supra note 43, at 399; see also id. (noting that the international community is 
questioning the continued efficacy of the current international legal framework and its long-
term viability in contemporary world affairs). 
 143. See infra Part IV.B.1.a. 
 144. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, art. 1 (providing that the ICC’s jurisdiction 
complements, but does not supersede, national criminal jurisdiction); Implementation of the 
Rome Statute, COAL. FOR THE ICC, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2010) (noting that the ICC is a court of last resort). 
 145. See infra Part IV.B.1.b. 
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endangers the success of the worldwide struggle against them, for it 
provides those entities with the right of self-preservation.146 Both 
considerations demonstrate that the only solution is a remodeling of 
the crime. 
1. Threats to Effective Prosecution of Aggression. 
 
a. Jurisdictional Limitations.  The ICC is intended to complement 
national criminal courts and provide an overarching judicial structure 
that guarantees the effective prosecution of the four core 
international crimes.147 To this end, its jurisdictional provisions are 
far-reaching.148 With respect to the crime of aggression, in particular, 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute—as amended at the Kampala Review 
Conference—creates a broad jurisdictional structure that allows the 
ICC to exercise jurisdiction when a case is referred to the ICC 
Prosecutor by the Security Council or a state party to the Rome 
Statute, or when the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio 
motu.149 But under this complex jurisdictional fabric, the ICC’s ability 
to try acts of aggression is limited in two critical respects. First, a state 
that is not party to the Rome Statute may not refer, and the ICC 
Prosecutor may not investigate proprio motu, alleged crimes of 
aggression committed on the territory of that nonparty state. Second, 
a state party to the Rome Statute may not refer, and the Prosecutor 
may not investigate proprio motu, alleged crimes of aggression 
committed by the nationals of a nonparty state.150 In the 
contemporary context of international terrorism, both jurisdictional 
constraints curtail the ICC’s ability to prosecute acts of aggression. 
Many major targets of international terrorism, including the 
United States, Russia, Israel, India, and Pakistan, are not parties to 
the Rome Statute. Neither is a host of other countries that have been 
 
 146. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 147. See Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, pmbl., art. 5. 
 148. See id. arts. 12, 13 (establishing broad jurisdictional provisions and noting that the court 
may exercise jurisdiction if a matter is referred to the ICC Prosecutor by a state party or by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, or if the Prosecutor initiates an 
investigation proprio motu); ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 15 (amending Article 15 of the 
Rome Statute to create a broad jurisdictional provision that applies specifically to the crime of 
aggression). 
 149. ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 15. 
 150. Id. Annex I, art. 15 bis, para. 5 (“In respect of a State that is not a party to this Statute, 
the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when committed by that 
State’s nationals or on its territory.”) 
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targets of large-scale terrorist attacks, including China, Iraq, Turkey, 
and Sudan.151 The first jurisdictional limitation will bar these states 
from referring potential cases of aggression to the ICC Prosecutor 
and will prevent the Prosecutor from initiating investigations proprio 
motu. But because some major target states, including Afghanistan 
and the United Kingdom, are party to the Rome Statute and likely to 
adopt the new definition of aggression, the constraints imposed by 
this first limitation will be somewhat mitigated. 
Unfortunately, the effects of the second jurisdictional limitation 
will be much less restrained. If terrorist organizations were granted 
full statehood, they would have to accede to the Rome Statute and 
accept the new definition of aggression before a state party could 
refer, or the ICC Prosecutor could investigate proprio motu, an act of 
violence committed by them. This would almost certainly not occur. 
Terrorist groups resort to frequent use of force; indeed, their very 
existence is premised on violence.152 Because signing onto the Rome 
Statute would subject their leaders to prosecution for the large-scale 
attacks they orchestrate, and might even jeopardize their continued 
existence,153 no terrorist organization would take the risk.154 Together, 
 
 151. See 3 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE 
SECRETARY-GENERAL, at 179–81, U.N. Doc ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 
(2009) (listing the countries that are parties to the Rome Statute). See generally UNIV. OF MD. 
GLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASE, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) 
(providing a detailed database of terrorist incidents worldwide); Worldwide Incidents Tracking 
System, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, https://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/ 
index.do?N=0 (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (providing another database of terrorist incidents 
worldwide). 
 152. See Roberto Toscano, More on Defining Terror, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 2007, at 111, 111 
(suggesting that terrorist groups resort to force and violence to achieve their objectives 
(referencing historian Caleb Carr)). 
 153. See S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2(e), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (requiring that, as a 
means of eliminating terrorism, all states criminalize it and prosecute its perpetrators). 
 154. Some may argue that terrorist organizations, as weak states, have an incentive to 
accede to the Rome Statute and accept the new definition of aggression in order to obtain the 
legal protections the Statute and definition provide. See, e.g., Ferencz, supra note 14 (noting 
that, when drafting the Rome Statute, “[w]eak states” supported the inclusion of aggression in 
Article 5(2) because they “wanted a firm legal shield to protect them from aggressors”). Indeed, 
terrorism is a tactic employed by those too weak to achieve their objectives through legal or 
otherwise legitimate means. By becoming parties to the Rome Statute and adopting the new 
definition of aggression, these weak entities might obtain some of the legal protections they 
need to fulfill their goals without resorting to violence. The contention here, however, is that the 
terrorist organizations capable of committing acts of aggression are fundamentally unique 
entities whose needs and desires cannot be satiated by legal guarantees. The objective of these 
groups is not to coexist with the larger, more powerful states, but to shape and direct their 
policies or destroy them altogether. See Max Abrahms, What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist 
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these observations suggest that, if granted complete statehood, 
terrorist organizations would often escape prosecution before the 
ICC by targeting states that are not parties to the Rome Statute and 
by refusing to accede to that agreement themselves. The result would 
be that many cases would evade the court’s jurisdiction. 
Perhaps recognizing the deleterious effects these two limitations 
would have on the ICC’s ability to exercise jurisdiction over 
independent terrorist groups, amended Article 15 expands the court’s 
jurisdictional reach under two alternative conditions: the ICC 
Prosecutor may initiate a case involving any act of transnational 
violence committed by any state if (1) the Security Council refers the 
case,155 or (2) the Security Council declares the violence an act of 
aggression.156 Unfortunately, however, both provisions are themselves 
quite restricted. 
First, the Security Council has referred only one case to the ICC 
Prosecutor since the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002.157 It is 
therefore unclear how often the court’s jurisdictional limitations will 
be circumvented by this method. Second, the Security Council 
historically has been unable or unwilling to recognize an armed attack 
as an act of aggression. From its inception, it has expressly 
 
Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy, 32 INT’L SECURITY 78, 82, (2008) (“[T]errorist 
organizations . . . seldom seize opportunities to become productive nonviolent political 
parties . . . [and] reflexively reject compromise proposals offering significant policy concessions 
by the target government.”); Toscano, supra note 152, at 111 (defining terrorism as “‘warfare 
deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either 
leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable’” (quoting historian Caleb 
Carr)); Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 97 (“Al Qaeda’s goals are not to conquer 
territory, control resources, nor even further traditional political or ideological purposes. They 
seek weapons of mass destruction—not as deterrents against the actions of other states—but for 
use at times and in places calculated to cause maximum destruction and horror.”). Signing onto 
the Rome Statute and the new definition of aggression might protect these terrorist 
organizations from attacks by stronger states, but it would also rob them of the primary means 
by which they can achieve their ends—deliberate violence against civilian targets. 
 155. See ICC, supra note 3, Annex I, art. 15 ter, para. 1 (providing that the ICC may exercise 
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression in accordance with Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute). 
 156. Id. Annex I, art. 15 bis, para. 7 (“Where the Security Council has made such a 
determination, the Prosecutor may proceed with the investigation in respect of a crime of 
aggression.”). 
 157. Communications and Referrals, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and 
+Cases/Referals+and+communications (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). The Council referred the 
situation in Darfur, but it did not specifically allege a crime of aggression. See generally S.C. 
Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005) (deciding “to refer the situation in Darfur 
since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,” but never alleging any 
specific crime). 
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condemned aggression a mere thirty-one times.158 More importantly, 
the Security Council has generally refrained from recognizing acts of 
international terrorism as aggression.159 Not even the attacks of 
September 11 were given that designation.160 Instead, the Council 
prefers terming armed attacks as threats to international peace and 
security, breaches of international peace and security, or unlawful 
uses of force.161 
Theoretically, this contemporary practice places few limits on the 
ICC’s jurisdiction. Regardless of what language the Security Council 
employs to describe a given instance of transnational violence, the 
ICC may determine for itself whether it and the Prosecutor have been 
properly authorized to proceed under paragraph 7 of amended 
Article 15.162 But in reality, the Council’s linguistic decisions may 
 
 158. Weisbord, supra note 6, at 169 (citing Nicolaos Strapatsas, Rethinking General 
Assembly Resolution 3314 (1974) as a Basis for the Definition of Aggression Under the Rome 
Statute of the ICC, in RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE SUBSTANTIVE PART 
155, 178 (Olaoluwa Lousanya ed., 2007)). Of the thirty-one recognized acts of aggression, 
nineteen condemned South Africa for attacks against other African states; six condemned 
Southern Rhodesia for attacks against other African states; two condemned acts of aggression 
committed against the Seychelles; two condemned Israeli attacks against Tunisia; one 
condemned acts of aggression against Benin; and one condemned Iraq for attacks against 
Kuwait. Id. Major conflicts like the Korean War, the Six Day War, the Iran-Iraq War, the 
Falklands War, the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, and countless other incidents of 
transnational violence were either labeled euphemistically or not named at all. See id. (listing 
several major prima facie acts of aggression that were never explicitly recognized by the 
Security Council). 
 159. Not until the 1990s did the Security Council begin to characterize international terrorist 
attacks as threats to international peace and security. Even then, the Council never expressly 
recognized such violence as an act of aggression. See Andrea Bianchi, Security Council’s Anti-
Terror Resolutions and Their Implementation by Member States: An Overview, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 1044, 1045 (2006) (noting that the Security Council characterized several high-profile 
international terrorist attacks in the 1990s as threats to international peace and security). 
 160. See S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (regarding the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, “like any act of international terrorism, as a threat to 
international peace and security”). 
 161. See David Scheffer, A Pragmatic Approach to Jurisdictional and Definitional 
Requirements for the Crime of Aggression in the Rome Statute, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 397, 
404 (2009) (“The Security Council rarely resorts to ‘aggression’ terminology and . . . has used 
the term to describe relatively minor uses of military force while using other U.N. Charter 
terminology . . . to describe far more significant uses of military force classically regarded as 
aggression.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 406 (noting the possibility that the Security Council 
“may never again” formally recognize an act of aggression); see also supra notes 158–60; cf. 
Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, Article 39, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: 
A COMMENTARY 717, 719 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002) (finding that the Security Council 
enjoys significant discretion in determining whether a threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an 
act of aggression exists). 
 162. Some authors posit that the Security Council’s recognition of a threat to or breach of 
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greatly affect the ICC’s jurisdictional reach. The U.N. Charter 
implicitly distinguishes between a threat to or breach of the peace and 
an act of aggression, for it provides in Article 39163 that “[t]he Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”164 Professor David Scheffer, 
chief negotiator of the U.S. delegation at Rome, bolsters this 
conclusion: “The modern world describes what is occurring in the 
field . . . as breaches of the peace which sometimes—although . . . 
infrequently—would embrace the classic understanding of 
‘aggression’ and yet more often would be defined as uses of armed 
force falling short of ‘aggression.’”165 Allowing “breach of the peace” 
or similar alternative language to act as the functional equivalent of 
“aggression” when the two are in fact distinct ignores the intent of the 
Security Council166 and creates a legal fiction not supported by 
practice. Worse, it risks negatively impacting the Security Council’s 
decisionmaking process167 and promises to weaken state support for 
the ICC.168 In light of these dangers, the ICC may be reluctant to 
interpret these terms interchangeably and permit prosecutions of 
 
international peace and security, or an unlawful use of force, can be interpreted as a de facto 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed if the language is memorialized in a 
declaration pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 161, at 
404 (“Once the Security Council determines that a breach of the peace has occurred, often by 
condemning it, that determination memorialized in a resolution should be sufficient to trigger a 
process that can determine whether an act of state-on-state aggression per se has occurred, 
which then would enable the ICC to investigate persons for purposes of individual criminal 
culpability.”); id. at 408 (“If the Security Council determines that a breach of the peace has 
occurred and has identified the offending state in a Chapter VII resolution embodying the 
determination, then the Council for all intents and purposes has denied the legitimacy of any 
rationale for the use of armed force by the offending state in the particular situation . . . .”). 
Chapter VII denotes the circumstances under which the use of force may be authorized. U.N. 
Charter ch. VII. 
 163. Article 39 is the first article in Chapter VII. 
 164. U.N. Charter art. 39 (emphasis added). 
 165. Scheffer, supra note 161, at 407. 
 166. It risks initiating a prosecution the Security Council never intended to allow. ICC, 
Assembly of States Parties, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, ¶ 30, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1 (July 25, 2007) (“[U]nder 
such an approach a Council decision might be interpreted as [a] de facto determination of an act 
of aggression, irrespective of the Council’s intention.”). 
 167. Scheffer, supra note 161, at 405. (warning that such an approach “might . . . negative[ly] 
impact . . . the decision-making within the Council, which might adjust the way it used certain 
terms”). 
 168. See id. at 406–07 (noting that the strategy of allowing the ICC to exercise jurisdiction 
when the Security Council recognizes a threat to, or breach of, the peace resulting from the 
threat or use of armed force by one state against another lacks widespread support). 
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nonstate parties without clear authorization from the Security 
Council. 
The purpose of the preceding argument is not to show that the 
ICC could never prosecute an act of aggression committed by a 
terrorist group. The court in fact possesses remarkably broad 
jurisdiction.169 Rather, this analysis reveals that the ICC’s reach is far 
from universal. Coupled with its role as a court of last resort,170 the 
ICC’s imperfect jurisdictional triggers suggest that primary 
responsibility for prosecuting aggression will rest with national legal 
systems. Through the principle of complementarity,171 municipal 
courts will be prepared to fulfill this duty. Although the issue is still 
vigorously debated, conservative predictions indicate that the 
definition of aggression as adopted by the ASP will be transplanted 
into the domestic law of those states parties to the Rome Statute that 
accept the new formulation.172 Should the task of prosecuting 
aggression fall to them, those countries’ domestic courts will have a 
clearly defined crime with which to work. But if that definition 
requires that terrorist organizations be classified as states before their 
leaders can be charged with aggression—as the present conception 
does—and if so classifying those groups requires conferring statehood 
upon them for all purposes to which that designation is relevant—as it 
should—then terrorist leaders who commit the crime will likely 
escape domestic jurisdiction by invoking sovereign immunity. 
b. Sovereign Immunity for High-Ranking Terrorist Leaders.  By 
virtue of their position, high-ranking officials of every state are 
entitled to sovereign immunity, both functional and personal. In its 
most basic form, the principle of ratione materiae—functional 
immunity—frees sitting senior state officials from personal legal 
responsibility for any act committed in the exercise of their official 
duties.173 Because functional immunity rests on the notion that actions 
 
 169. See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 171. Under the principle of complementarity, states parties to the Rome Statute are 
expected to implement domestically each provision of that agreement. This principle and its 
implications are discussed in further detail in Part IV.B.1.b, infra. 
 172. See generally Roger S. Clark, Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome 
Statute, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 413 (2009) (elaborating on the issue of complementarity 
and the debate surrounding it). 
 173. DUGARD, supra note 64, at 253. 
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taken by a state official are attributable only to the state,174 both 
current and former state officials may invoke its protection.175 The 
scope of the protection, however, is decidedly narrow. A state official 
is relieved of liability if, and only if, the official’s actions are 
performed while in office and fall within the official’s delegated 
authority.176 
Immunity ratione personae—personal immunity—operates quite 
differently. Unlike functional immunity, personal immunity is a 
procedural defense.177 That is, although an act committed by the state 
official is legally imputable to him, the official is immune from civil or 
criminal jurisdiction.178 This protection extends to all actions taken by 
a serving state official; however, because it does not deflect legal 
responsibility from the individual to the state, personal immunity no 
longer exists once the official ceases to hold office.179 
Together, functional and personal immunity provide robust 
protection for high-ranking state officials.180 According to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), this degree of immunity is 
necessary for the proper direction of state and foreign affairs;181 
however, it also stifles the effective prosecution of aggression in 
domestic courts. 
Fundamental principles of international law strongly suggest that 
all rights attaching to statehood—including sovereign immunity for 
 
 174. As the District Court for the Northern District of California summarized in Lyders v. 
Lund, 32 F.2d 308 (N.D. Cal. 1929), “suits [against high-ranking state officials] based upon 
official, authorized acts, performed within the scope of their duties on behalf of the foreign 
state . . . are actions against” that state as a whole, and not against the official as an individual. 
Id. at 309. 
 175. DUGARD, supra note 64, at 253. 
 176. ILIAS BANTEKAS & SUSAN NASH, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 101 (3d ed. 2007). 
 177. Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? 
Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853, 863–64 (2002). 
 178. See id. at 862–63 (noting that under functional immunity, legal responsibility cannot be 
attributed to the individual, but suggesting that under personal immunity it can). 
 179. Id. at 863–64. 
 180. Functional and personal immunity operate in tandem such that one often fills the gaps 
left by limitations imposed upon the other. But they do not offer any protection in the domestic 
courts of the official’s state, or when the official’s state has waived these immunities. Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) (Arrest Warrant Case), 
2002 I.C.J. 3, 25 (Feb. 14). Terrorist organizations, however, are unlikely to try their own leaders 
or waive their immunities. Those groups instead “display an utter disregard for . . . the rule of 
law.” Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 115. 
 181. In a recent case, the ICJ opined that “the immunities accorded to [high-ranking state 
officials] are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective performance of 
their functions on behalf of their respective States.” Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. at 21. 
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senior state officials—should be conferred upon entities that are 
designated as states.182 Thus, if terrorist organizations were considered 
states under the current definition of aggression, then their leaders 
would acquire functional and personal immunity. This may appear to 
pose little threat to the effective prosecution of aggression. Under the 
principle of complementarity, states parties to the Rome Statute are 
expected to implement domestically each provision of that 
agreement.183 Included among those provisions is Article 27, which 
eliminates all immunities that would otherwise exempt an individual 
from prosecution for one of the four core international crimes.184 
The validity under international law of any domestic analogue to 
Article 27, however, is questionable. Relevant case law185 and the 
writings of prominent international legal scholars186 indicate that 
personal immunity unconditionally protects serving state officials 
from national jurisdiction, regardless of the nature and gravity of 
their actions. As long as they hold their positions, therefore, senior 
leaders of terrorist organizations that are considered states in all 
contexts would be completely immune from prosecution in foreign 
municipal courts, whether they commit aggression, another core 
international crime, or some lesser offense. Once a senior terrorist 
leader ceases to hold office, though, personal immunity will no longer 
offer any protection. But functional immunity may still bar 
prosecution for the crime of aggression. 
Whether functional immunity ceases to apply when the act in 
question is a core international crime—like aggression—is uncertain. 
National and international courts alike continue to adopt differing 
 
 182. See supra Part IV.A. 
 183. COAL. FOR THE ICC, FACTSHEET: ICC IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 1 (2006), 
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-CICC-Implementation-Legislation.pdf. 
 184. Rome Statute of the ICC, supra note 14, art. 27. 
 185. See, e.g., R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 
[2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) 201–02 (appeal taken from Q.B.) (“Th[e] immunity enjoyed by a head 
of state in power . . . is a complete immunity . . . rendering him immune from all actions or 
prosecutions whether or not they relate to matters done for the benefit of the state.”); Arrest 
Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. at 24 (finding no exceptions to the rule that gives immunity from 
criminal prosecution to serving officials). 
 186. See, e.g., Cassese, supra note 177, at 864 (“[E]ven when [a senior state official] is faced 
with [charges of committing a core international crime, the official] is inviolable and immune 
from prosecution on the strength of the international rules on personal immunities.”); Steffen 
Wirth, Immunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ’s Judgment in the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 877, 883 (2002) (“[I]mmunity ratione personae, is . . . all-encompassing . . . regardless of 
the conduct in question.”). 
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approaches.187 A recent ICJ decision, however, hinted that it does not. 
In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Arrest Warrant Case),188 the court 
decided that after a high-ranking state official ceases to hold office, he 
can be tried in a foreign national court “in respect of acts committed 
prior or subsequent to his . . . period of office, as well as in respect of 
acts committed during [his] period of office in a private capacity.”189 
Though this reasoning is ultimately dicta, that the court “carefully 
examined State practice, including national legislation and those few 
decisions of national higher courts” before arriving at its conclusion190 
suggests that this public-private distinction may represent the 
prevailing judicial view. Several municipal courts and judges have in 
fact espoused this understanding.191 
If the language in the Arrest Warrant Case indeed represents the 
dominant approach, and if terrorist organizations were classified as 
states in all contexts, then their former leaders could not be 
prosecuted for aggression in foreign national courts unless their acts 
were considered private. This private-act exception is unlikely to be 
met, for the crime of aggression is inherently a public act.192 As 
 
 187. See, e.g., Gaddafi Case, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 
crim., Mar. 13, 2001, 125 I.L.R. 490, 490–510 (Fr.) (holding that sovereign immunity protected 
Libyan Arab Republic leader Muammar al-Gaddafi from prosecution for the terrorist bombing 
of a UTA flight on September 19, 1989); Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 1 A.C. at 201–06 
(holding that former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet had immunity for acts of torture 
committed prior to the United Kingdom’s 1988 ratification of the International Convention 
against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, but no 
immunity for acts of torture committed after that ratification); Arrest Warrant Case, 2002 I.C.J. 
at 25 (relying on a public-private-act distinction in asserting that sovereign immunity for 
incumbent or former heads of state does not bar criminal prosecution in all circumstances); 
Wirth, supra note 186, at 884–85 (describing the case of Suriname head of state Dési Bouterse, 
in which the Gerechtshof Amsterdam denied Bouterse immunity for crimes he allegedly 
committed while in office in the 1980s). 
 188. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium) (Arrest 
Warrant Case), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14). 
 189. Id. at 25 (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. at 24. In fact, Belgium, the complainant in the case, had in its domestic law at the 
time a provision abrogating all immunities for individuals charged with core international 
crimes. Damien Vandermeersch, The ICC Statute and Belgian Law, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 133, 
143 (2004). The ICJ found this insufficient to destroy the functional and personal immunity 
enjoyed by both serving and former senior state officials. 
 191. E.g., Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] 1 A.C. at 201–06; Wirth, supra note 186, at 884–
85. 
 192. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 16, at 
43 (“Individual responsibility for [the crime of aggression] is intrinsically and inextricably linked 
to the commission of aggression by a State. . . . [S]uch a violation of the law by a State is a sine 
qua non condition for the possible attribution to an individual of responsibility for a crime of 
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international criminal law scholar Antonio Cassese acknowledges, the 
position and rank occupied by senior state officials places them “in a 
position to order, instigate, or aid and abet or culpably tolerate or 
condone” the criminal acts they perpetrate.193 It would be artificial to 
declare international crimes committed by these officials to be private 
acts, for “[t]his would mean . . . that . . . crimes against 
peace . . . should be regarded as ‘private acts . . . .’”194 Echoing 
Cassese’s observation, Professor Claus Kress, a German delegate to 
the Special Working Group, stresses that “the crime of 
aggression” is “intimately linked to state policy.”195 Without the use of 
artificial legal constructs, the crime of aggression cannot be 
considered a private act. Consequently, personal immunity will 
protect terrorist leaders while they hold their positions, and 
functional immunity will likely shield them when they do not.196 If 
global terrorist organizations are classified as states in all contexts, 
therefore, the present definition of aggression will likely permit 
leaders of the greatest contemporary threat to international peace 
and security to escape punishment for their transgressions. 
Defining the crime of aggression with exclusive reference to state 
behavior is consequently dangerous. If, on the one hand, it requires 
that terrorist organizations be classified as states solely for purposes 
of prosecuting aggression, an exclusively state-centric formulation 
creates a grotesque legal milieu in which a political entity can be 
simultaneously a state and a nonstate. As applied to terrorist 
organizations, a state-centric definition also disregards the sovereign 
equality of states by imposing obligations of statehood on entities that 
are entitled to none of the associated rights. If, on the other hand, 
such a definition requires conferring statehood upon terrorist 
organizations for all purposes, then it increases the likelihood that 
leaders of terrorist organizations would be able to prevent effective 
prosecution in municipal courts by invoking sovereign immunity.197 
 
aggression.”). 
 193. Cassese, supra note 177, at 868. 
 194. Id. at 870. 
 195. Kress, supra note 141, at 862. 
 196. The argument here is not that a customary norm dissolving immunities for core 
international crimes could never exist. The law in this field is entirely too flexible for such 
absolutism. Rather, the gravamen of the preceding analysis is that a core-international-crimes 
exception to functional and personal immunities does not presently exist. 
 197. Judge Damien Vandermeersch of the Court of First Instance in Brussels concurs, 
noting that the ICJ’s ruling in the Arrest Warrant Case dictates that the ICC’s jurisdiction is no 
longer concurrent with that of national courts, but is “exclusive in respect of those who can 
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Perhaps worse, it also undermines global efforts to suppress these 
groups by guaranteeing their right to preserve their existence. 
2. Threats to the Global Struggle against Terrorism.  Historically, 
the international community has followed a law-enforcement 
approach to suppressing terrorism, a method predicated on capturing 
terrorists and prosecuting them under domestic law and in domestic 
courts.198 But the events of September 11, 2001, and the new era of 
international terrorism they ushered in, demand a different strategy.199 
Instead of relying solely on national law and disjointed domestic 
judicial processes, many states have shifted their focus to the use of 
force against terrorist organizations.200 This new approach is 
fundamentally affected by a definition of aggression that classifies 
terrorist organizations as states in all contexts. 
Included among the rights guaranteed to all states is the right to 
continued existence unhindered by others.201 The Montevideo 
Convention, for instance, expressly declares that “[t]he fundamental 
rights of states are not susceptible [to] being affected in any manner 
whatsoever,”202 and thus “[n]o state has the right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of another.”203 This rule permits every state 
to actively defend its sovereignty. The U.N. Charter enshrined this 
principle in Article 51, guaranteeing states their inherent right to self-
defense.204 
 
invoke their immunity before national courts that have initiated proceedings against them.” 
Vandermeersch, supra note 190, at 144. Given the number of cases that will fall to national 
courts because of the ICC’s role as a court of last resort and its imperfect jurisdictional triggers, 
coupled with the emergence of international terrorism as the gravest threat to global peace and 
the most prevalent form of aggression, see supra Part II, this result is troubling. 
 198. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98; see also John Dugard, International 
Terrorism: Problems of Definition, 50 INT’L AFF. 67, 67–74 (1974) (providing a succinct history 
of international efforts made since the nineteenth century to curtail the rise and spread of global 
terrorism). 
 199. See Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 53, at 98–100 (noting that the law-enforcement 
approach has historically dominated, but that recent events now require a more forceful 
response to terrorism). 
 200. See id. at 106 (“As the threat of transnational terrorism became more apparent, . . . the 
world community became more tolerant of military actions against states that supported 
terrorism.”). The United States’ War on Terror provides evidence of this transition. 
 201. See MAY, supra note 52, at 310 (questioning whether terrorist organizations are 
legitimate enough to be classified as states and thus to be guaranteed a continued existence free 
of any external interference). 
 202. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, supra note 59, art. 5. 
 203. Id. art. 8. 
 204. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
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Under a definition of aggression that confers statehood in its 
entirety on terrorist organizations, this privilege must extend to 
them.205 This extension, however, jeopardizes international efforts to 
actively eradicate terrorism, as it confers upon terrorist groups the 
right to preserve their existence when threatened.206 Classifying 
terrorist organizations as states for purposes of the crime of 
aggression may thus generate enormous policy concerns. From 
condemnation in the General Assembly, to the Draft Comprehensive 
Convention on the International Suppression of Terrorism, to the 
War on Terror, the international community has manifested a desire 
to destroy these groups. But by classifying them as states for all 
purposes, the international community would be stripped of its ability 
to pursue this goal, and much of the progress made against terrorism 
would be lost. 
In sum, the current approach of defining the crime of aggression 
with exclusive reference to state behavior is troublesome. 
Independent, transnational terrorist organizations have emerged as 
the prevailing threat to international peace and security. They are 
capable of unleashing devastating attacks that not only rival the 
military strength of many states but that also can be legitimately 
called acts of aggression.207 At the Kampala Review Conference, the 
international community could not have afforded to let another 
opportunity to finally define the crime of aggression slip through its 
fingers; however, adopting an antiquated definition was the wrong 
solution. As Professor Weisbord recognizes, “[a] backward-looking 
definition that fails to regulate important forms of aggression as they 
emerge is fated to become irrelevant. A definition that does not fit 
the sociological phenomenon it seeks to regulate is, and will be 
perceived to be, unjust” and illegitimate.208 Despite Weisbord’s novel 
constructive argument, the definition of aggression as currently 
formulated continues to be backward looking, for it does not mirror 
the present reality of international aggression.209 Even ignoring the 
taxonomic difficulties of broadening the term “State” to include 
 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security.”). 
 205. See supra Part IV.A. 
 206. MAY, supra note 52, at 310. 
 207. See supra Part II. 
 208. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 8. 
 209. See supra Part II. 
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terrorist organizations,210 doing so either undermines the ICC and the 
international system on which it rests, or jeopardizes efforts to 
destroy terrorist groups and bring their leaders to justice.211 The 
current definition causes more problems than it resolves, and it 
should be reconsidered. State centrism should be abandoned, and 
both states and nonstate groups should be expressly included within 
the ambit of the crime. Only this approach can avoid the negative 
consequences enumerated in this Part. 
V.  PROPERLY RESTRICTING THE CONCEPT OF NONSTATE GROUPS 
Beyond political apprehensions, the primary concern with 
redrafting the definition of aggression to explicitly include both states 
and nonstate groups is that it would create a framework so boundless 
in scope that it could not be reasonably applied in practice. An overly 
broad conception of aggression would permit excessive prosecutorial 
discretion,212 result in liability that exceeds the scope of moral 
culpability,213 and rob the ICC of institutional legitimacy. These risks 
are particularly acute in the contemporary context, given the 
difficulty of delineating the contours of international terrorism. Not 
only can the phenomenon be expressed in innumerable forms, but it 
is also largely indistinguishable from mere criminal activity. As 
Colonel Hammes explains, “[w]e have slid so far away from national 
armies that often it is impossible to tell [terrorist organizations] from 
simple criminal elements. Many of the former are, in fact, criminal 
elements—either they use crime to support their cause or they use 
their cause to legitimize their crime.”214 Confronted with these 
challenges, the scope of the term “nonstate groups” as used in the 
proposed definition must be sufficiently limited. 
 
 210. See supra Part III. 
 211. See supra Part IV. 
 212. See generally Osiel, supra note 80, at 1801 (discussing the risks of relying on 
prosecutorial discretion to temper an overly broad theory of liability). 
 213. See id. at 1772 (“[Making it too easy to convict defendants as participants in a joint 
criminal enterprise] increasingly lures international law to a point where liability threatens to 
exceed the scope of moral culpability.”). 
 214. Hammes, supra note 39, at 20; see also Osiel, supra note 80, at 1799–1800 (“Much 
ordinary crime today clearly displays a profusion of global linkages . . . . ‘[T]he growing and 
dangerous links between terrorist groups, drug traffickers and their paramilitary gangs’ which 
have resulted ‘in all types of violence’ across several continents . . . sew all these into a single, 
seamless enterprise of worldwide wrongdoing.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Emmanouela 
Mylonaki, The Manipulation of Organized Crime by Terrorists: Legal and Factual Perspectives, 2 
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 213, 230 (2002))). 
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Perhaps the best approach is to first assess what conduct the 
international community seeks to criminalize as aggression, and then 
reason backward through its definitional implications to arrive at a 
satisfactorily restricted conception of nonstate groups. In this regard, 
the evolution of the definition of aggression is instructive. From the 
formulation adopted by the General Assembly in 1974,215 to the 
conclusion reached by the International Law Commission in 1996,216 
to the current definition, all conceptualizations have been dominated 
by a fixation on the state. Even when the actions of nonstate groups 
were captured within the scope of the 1974 definition—the only 
formulation to ever include them—the groups were considered state 
agents rather than independent actors.217 This history demonstrates 
that the archetypical understanding of aggression is an armed attack 
by one state on another.218 A definition of aggression that expressly 
includes nonstate groups can therefore be adequately bounded by 
encompassing only those entities that are capable of acting like a state 
in their use of force.219 
In determining what it means to act like a state, judges must not 
focus on organizational or leadership structure. To act like a state, a 
group need not structurally resemble one. Concluding otherwise 
would defeat the purpose of extending the definition of aggression to 
nonstate groups. As previously explained, these entities often lack the 
physical characteristics or legal order that are indicative of 
statehood.220 Furthermore, the bureaucratic organizational structure 
that typically characterizes a state does not extend to modern war-
making groups like independent terrorist organizations. These 
entities are instead based on extensive, decentralized networks in 
which one acquires power and leadership not by any formal position, 
but by one’s centrality within the network and ability to influence 
 
 215. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 16. 
 216. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, supra note 16, at 43. 
 217. See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 16, art. 3, para. g (providing that if a state sends a 
nonstate group to exercise armed force against another state, and if that group executes an 
attack that is sufficiently grave that it would have constituted an illegal act of war if it had been 
committed by the sending state itself, the attack will be considered an act of aggression 
committed by the sending state). 
 218. See MAY, supra note 52, at 307 (“States are the paradigm case of entities that can wage 
war.”). 
 219. Professor Larry May agrees, noting that “if there are other entities that can act like 
States, then perhaps they too can wage war.” Id. This would include groups like al Qaeda that 
today pose the greatest threat to international peace and security. Id. at 307–08. 
 220. See supra Part III.A. 
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others.221 Including nonstate groups in the definition of aggression but 
requiring that they resemble state actors before they can be 
prosecuted for the crime would rob the concept of its elasticity and 
produce a formulation as irrelevant as one that excludes nonstate 
entities altogether. 
Instead, the judges’ inquiry must concentrate on behavior, 
focusing on whether the scale and nature of the act, not the group 
that committed it, is sufficiently statelike to constitute aggression.222 
Although seemingly broad in scope, this approach is in fact quite 
narrow. The ability to act like a state is a high threshold. Rarely does 
an individual or group possess the coordination and structure to do 
anything even remotely statelike.223 This is particularly true for major 
international crimes. “[These] wrongs are radically different from the 
garden-variety crime in response to which standard legal doctrines 
were developed. These differences rise to a level that may not be 
merely numerical, but categorical.”224 Beyond this general 
observation, exactly what constitutes an act of aggression exceeds the 
scope of this Note. But whatever aggression entails, only a limited 
range of nonstate actors can commit it. And when leaders of those 
nonstate entities initiate violence that crosses the threshold of 
aggression, they may, and must, be prosecuted for the crime. 
Thus, developing a narrow, workable conception of nonstate 
groups is not the daunting task it may initially appear to be. The 
interpretive method proposed in this Part offers a means by which the 
ASP can expressly include those entities in the definition of 
aggression without broadening the scope of the crime beyond its 
 
 221. See Weisbord, supra note 4, at 16–17 (detailing the shifts in the structure of war-making 
organizations). 
 222. A separate, but related, debate concerns whether the definition of aggression should 
include only armed attacks, or whether it should encompass economic aggression, systems 
disruptions, and other means of unarmed attack. See, e.g., Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in 
the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L. 224, 224–28 (1977) (analyzing the debates 
over economic aggression during the negotiations regarding the 1974 definition and finding that 
the issue was left unresolved); Weisbord, supra note 4, at 37–43 (setting forth more generally the 
competing sides of the present debate over unarmed aggression and arguing that the present 
draft definition conceives of aggression too narrowly). This debate is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 223. MAY, supra note 52, at 307; see also Larry May, Aggression, Humanitarian Intervention, 
and Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321, 336–40 (2009) (concluding that some terrorist 
groups are statelike in their ability to use violence, but most more closely resemble criminal 
gangs). 
 224. Osiel, supra note 80, at 1765. 
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useful limits. Now, the most formidable obstacle to a flexible, 
accurate definition of aggression is the absence of political will. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals of the mid-1940s, 
sporadic progress has been made toward ending impunity for 
aggressors. As the ASP has now adopted the first precise definition of 
the crime of aggression, it should be lauded for its achievement. 
Nevertheless, the international community’s work remains 
incomplete. In contemporary world affairs, a definition of aggression 
focused exclusively on state behavior carries little normative value. 
The modern transformations in warfare and the rise of independent 
terrorist organizations indicate that a state-centric conception of the 
offense cannot reach the greatest contemporary threat to 
international peace and security. Even considering the novel 
approach proposed by Professor Weisbord, the shortcomings of the 
present formulation persist. Encompassing independent war-making 
groups like terrorist organizations within the bounds of the present 
definition contradicts customary international law, is unworkable 
even under new and dynamic conceptions of statehood, and should 
thus be avoided. Otherwise, either the certainty and order of the 
international system will be undermined and the sovereign equality of 
states will be violated, or the effective prosecution of aggression will 
be inhibited and global efforts to suppress international terrorism 
burdened. To avoid these problems, the ASP should rewrite the 
definition of aggression to expressly apply to both states and nonstate 
groups. Achieving this new formulation will be difficult. The 
delegates to the ASP will likely balk at calls for reassessment after so 
much progress has been made. But the legal consequences and policy 
implications of applying the definition of aggression in its current 
form evince the need for reconceptualizing the offense. Otherwise, 
the breakthrough for which many have worked so hard will in fact be 
a setback, and the legal triumphs achieved at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
more than sixty years ago will be forfeited. 
